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Abstract: 
Identifying historical financial crisis: Bayesian stochastic search 
variable selection in logistic regression  
Chi-san Ho, M.S. Stat. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2009 
 
Supervisor: Paul Damien 
 
 
This work investigates the factors that contribute to financial crises. We first 
study the Dow Jones index performance by grouping the daily adjusted closing value 
into a two-month window and finding several critical quantiles in each window. Then, 
we identify severe downturn in these quantiles and find that the 5
th
 quantile is the best 
to identify financial crises. We then matched these quantiles with historical financial 
crises and gave a basic explanation about them. Next, we introduced all exogenous 
factors that could be related to the crises. Then, we applied a rapid Bayesian variable 
selection technique - Stochastic Search Variable Selection (SSVS) using a Bayesian 
logistic regression model. Finally, we analyzed the result of SSVS, leading to the 
conclusion that that the dummy variable we created for disastrous hurricane, crude oil 
price and gold price (GOLD) should be included in the model.  
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Identifying historical financial crisis: Bayesian stochastic search 
variable selection in logistic regression  
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The US financial market suffered severe challenges in 2008. The still ongoing 
financial crisis has been called the most serious one since the Great Depression by 
prestigious economists. While some experts are trying to find a remedy for this crisis, we 
are more interested in the cause of this rare event and in hope to find a way to predict the 
next one. The first thing we wanted to know is to have a clear time frame about when the 
crises started. As a result, we found a norm that identifies a financial crisis and then 
analysis the candidate factors that contributed to the crisis.  
 We mainly use logistic regression in this report and applied Bayesian stochastic 
search. Since all our data are time series, it is also important to know how many lags we 
should add in the model for each variable. Thus the amount of candidate variables will 
increase by several times. 
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Chapter 2:  Identifying Financial Crisis 
2.1 Performance of Dow Jones Index 
 There are many good indices which can be used for studying the economy. We 
picked Dow Jones Industrial Average for the following reasons. We are mainly interested 
in US economy and the Dow Jones Industrial Average has been established for the 
longest time and the data are easy to obtain. Furthermore, the component of the index is 
diversified enough and can well reflect the economy performance. 
 Our data is a daily time series from the first transaction day of 1971 to the last 
transaction day of 2008. In this report, we group our data in a special way which has not 
been used in other research to our knowledge. Our data are grouped in a two-month non-
overlapping window that contains anywhere from 38 to 44 transaction days, and we 
treated the data in each window as a random sample from a certain distribution. For 
example, the first window contains data from Jan. 4, 1971 to Feb 26, 1971 and the last 
window (the 228
th
) contains data from Nov.3, 2008 to Dec.31, 2008. Thus, we can study 
the performance of the index by studying different quantiles in each window.  The 









 Since the stock market grows exponentially, we take natural log of our data so 
that we can have a linear relationship between time and the index.  Due to the fact that 
we have more than 200 windows, we divide the data by decades. Figure 1~4 
demonstrates the distribution in each window and how they are associated with time. The 
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Our next step is to develop a metric to identify suspected financial crisis 
analytically.  We first examined the first order differences in those quantiles and decided 
to use -0.15 as a threshold to mark as a significant drop. We will verify this later. Table 1 




  Difference  Significant Difference Significant Difference Significant 
  in the 5th   in the first   in the   
Date quantile  Drop quartile  Drop median  Drop 
1974 Jul. to Aug. -17.65% ● -10.23%   -7.67%   
1974 Sep. to Oct. -11.15%   -14.80%   -16.81% ● 
1987 Sep. to Oct. -28.06% ● -7.39%   -0.47%   
1987 Nov. to Dec. -1.55%   -19.31% ● -27.46% ● 
2001 Sep. to Oct. -16.83% ● -14.24%   -12.96%   
2008 Sep to Oct. -27.18% ● -22.16% ● -9.10%   
2008 Nov. to Dec. -5.03%   -7.05%   -19.33% ● 
       
 Difference Significant Difference Significant   
 in the third   in the 95th     
Date quartile  Drop quantile  Drop   
1974 Jul. to Aug. -7.38%   -6.81% ●   
1974 Sep. to Oct. -17.21% ● -16.93% ●   
1987 Sep. to Oct. -3.02%   -2.61%     
1987 Nov. to Dec. -27.80% ● -27.67% ●   
2001 Sep. to Oct. -11.27%   -7.11%     
2008 Sep to Oct. -4.53%   -1.81%     
2008 Nov. to Dec. -23.31% ● -22.97% ●   
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In general, the 5
th
 quantile can detect the drop in an earlier window. It is not hard 
to understand the reason. When the market crashed, our window may include the data 
before the crash and result in better performances in other quantiles. The 5
th
 quantile is 
also more sensitive than the higher quantiles because it can detect the drop that other 
quantiles can’t.  As a result, we focused on the performance of the fifth quantile and use 
the windows detected by it to be the start of the financial crises. 
Next, we would like to explore whether these sudden drops are innate. Suppose 
our data came from a certain distribution. In this report, we used three different 
inequalities to generate the upper bound of the probability of those extreme values to 
occur. Given we don’t know anything except for the sample moments; we first applied 
Markov and Chebyshev inequalities.  
We now show that our sample distribution is quite consistent with the normal 
distribution in a normal quantile plot for most of the data (more than 95%) as seen in 
figure 5. There are several data points (5 out of 228) that showed a deviation from the 
normal distribution at the lower tail. We suspect these to be outliers. Since they are a 
small fraction of the entire data set, we will ignore these few points and apply the normal 
approximation to estimate the probability of extreme events. 
We set our significance level as 5%. From table 2, we can see that the normal 
approximation gave us the tightest estimation of the probabilities. Besides the 4 drops 
which we identified from our matric, we found another drop in 2002. Chebyshev 
inequality only gave us 1 significant drop which happened in 1987. Markov inequality 
was the worse among the three and failed to generate any useful information.  
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  Difference Markov Chebyshev   Normal 
  in the 5th         
Date   quantile Inequality Inequality Z-score  Approx. 
1987 Sep. to Oct. -28.06%  78.87%  4.93%  4.32 0.0008%  
2008 Sep to Oct. -27.18%  79.41%  5.27%  4.18 0.0015%  
1974 Jul. to Aug. -17.65%  85.84%  13.02%  2.66 0.3942%  
2001 Sep. to Oct. -16.83%  86.45%  14.41%  2.53 0.5766%  
    2002 Jul. to Aug. -14.17%  88.46%  20.82%  2.10 1.7814%  
 
We decided to use the result from normal approximation and the following 
research was based upon them. 
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2.2 Historical Financial Crisis  
 In this section, we would like to give a short review of these historical financial 
crises we identified from the 5
th
 quantile of our Dow Jones Industry Index. With the 
explanation from the economists and financial experts, we are able to seek our candidate 
variables in our model. 
 The crisis we identified in 1974 actually started at January 1973[1] and ended at 
around December 1974. This crisis affected all the major stock markets in the world. It 
was believed that the crash came after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system over the 
previous two years, with the associated “Nixon Shock” and United States dollar 
devaluation under the Smithsonian Agreement. The oil crisis that broke out in 1973 also 
compounded the market crash. Since the oil price crisis happened prior to the drop we 
identified, we believed it would be a good predictor in our model. 
 The well-known “Black Monday”[2]  occurred on October 19
th
 1987, which is the 
most significant one we identified. The crash began in Hong Kong and was the largest 
one-day percentage decline in stock market history. Although the cause of the event still 
continues as a debate, it is believed that the potential causes of the decline were 
overvaluation, illiquidity, and market psychology, especially the program trading. In our 
report, these factors were relatively hard to model. We could only focus on the liquidity 
side. 
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 The two drops we identified in 2001 and 2002 were from a same recession 
period. It was called the “Early 2000s recession”[3]
 
 It was believed that the recession 
was caused by the move of the Federal Reserve which made successive interest increases 
from 2000 to 2001 and also an aftermath of the dot-com bubble. The first drop we 





 and when it was reopened, the market dropped roughly 7.1% in one day.  The 
market rebounded after the attack but crashed once more in the second half of 2002.  
 The financial crisis we are experiencing now after the third quarter of 2008 is 
known as “Subprime mortgage crisis”[4]. It was believed to be caused by a combination 
of the government policy about house mortgage and the manipulation of the financial 
sector. Before the stock market crashed, the oil price roared to a historical high point and 
the gold price was also high in anticipation of the inflation. After the crisis, the housing 
index further plummeted and the unemployment rate rose.  
 Although every single crisis has its unique causes and circumstances, we would 
like to find the common factors. This might allow us to predict the probability of a crisis 
given the information provided by the covariates.  
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Chapter 3:  SSVS Model 
3.1 Forecasting Variables 
 In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that some of the stock market 
downturns are not likely to be generated by the process itself. As a result, we now would 
like to introduce several variables that might be able to explain the downturn. These 
variables are only available monthly or quarterly. In order to be consistent with our bi-
month window, we modified them by either taking geometric average (for ratio or index 
data) or arithmetic average.  
The first set of variables we are interested in are risk free investment return and 
the unemployment rate[5]. Since there is no perfect risk-free investment product, we used 
90 Day Treasury Bill rate (IRX)[6] instead. When the economy is in a boom, the Federal 
Reserve will increase the interest rate to prevent inflation. On the other hand, when there 
are signs of recession, the Federal Reserve will keep the interest rate low.  The 
unemployment rate is usually negatively related to the inflation rate. Also, a high 
unemployment rate implies poor economy. Hence, looking at the behavior of the IRX 
and unemployment rate only will give us an idea of health of the economy. These 
variables usually have reciprocal influence with the economy; however, for the sudden 
market crash, they might fail to provide predicting power since these data needs more 
time to collect and they react to the market with some lags. 
We next want to add some critical ratio and price indexes. We added the crude oil 
price index,[7] gold price index,[8] and total credit market debt as percentage of GDP[9]. 
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These variables affect an economy in different ways and may have some predicting 
power for the market crash.  
Since our dependent variable is binary and only 5 observations are 1’s, we lost 
other information provided by the previous performance of the stock market. We would 
like to create other variables which can provide the information we need from the 
performance of our quantiles. According to the theory of business cycle[10], financial 
crises usually came after a relatively long period of prosperity. We first created dummy 
variables and set them as 1 when the median increased and 0 when decreased in each 
window. We choose median to represent because we don’t want to add too many high 
correlated variables in our model. Then, we added up 30 consecutive windows which 
represent a five-year period to be a numerical variable ranged from 0 to 30. This variable 
gave us a rough idea that in the previous 5 years, the stock market is going up or down 
generally. Our hypothesis is that if the variable has large value, it means that the 
economy has grown for a long period and the crisis may happen soon in the near future.   
Finally, we would like to explore the relationship between the economy and the 
natural disasters. We searched through the historical major hurricanes[11] and created a 
dummy variable which is 1 when there was a hurricane during that window which caused 
at least a billion inflation adjusted dollar of damage.  
All the variables we add up to 5 lags and the original quantiles started at the first 
lag. Table 3 shows the summary of all covariates and their lags. 
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Table 3: 
Symbol  Description Type   Frequency 
IRX US 13-Week Treasury Bill Numerical Monthly 
UMP US Civilian Unemployment Rate Numerical Monthly 
COP Price of West Texas Intermediate Crud Numerical Monthly 
CMGDP US Total Credit Market Debt as Percentage of GDP Numerical Quarterly 
GOLD Gold Price Numerical Monthly 
HUR Historical Disastrous Hurricane Binary Bi-monthly 
Q5S The Fifth Quantile of DJ Index Series Numerical Bi-monthly 
Q50S The Median of DJ Index Series Numerical Bi-monthly 
SUMF The Sum of the DIFM in 30 Consecutive Windows Numerical Bi-monthly 
        
IRX1 The first lag of IRX Numerical Monthly 
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3.2 Bayesian Stochastic Search Variable Selection 
Theory 
 The Bayesian statistical technique we used in this report is called “Stochastic 
Search Variable Selection” (SSVS)[12]. SSVS is for feature selection in linear regression 
problems; it embeds the regression set up in a hierarchical Bayesian model for 
identification of promising variables.  
 Given predictors X = [X1, . . . ,Xk] , a dependent variable Y and a linear5 model 






, where ),0(~ 2 IN , we aim to find a selected subset of 
X1, . . . ,Xk which fits the model “best”. SSVS thinks promising subsets of predictors are 
those with higher posterior probabilities. Its goal is to avoid comparing all 2
k
 possible 
submodels by constructing an auxiliary Gibbs sequence in which the posterior 
distribution on the set of possible subset choices is embedded.  
 The idea is that if the variable Xj is very likely to be included in the model, we 
should have larger variance in 
j
 given the mean of 
j
 is 0. On the other hand, if the 
variable Xj is unlikely to be in the model, the variance of j  should be very small and 
thus, the distribution of 
j
 is closely centered toward 0. That is, we model the 
uncertainty of the variable selection through a mixture normal prior. In this report, we 
used logistic regression[13]. So our model is slightly different from the one above. 















N          (2) 
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 We then choose c  to be 1000 and  to be 0.001 because the coefficients have the 
interpretation of the log-odds ratio.[14-15] This covered the range from about -0.003 to 
0.003 when = 0 and when =1, it had more than 99 percent probability to cover the 
range from -3 to 3. Since we standardized all our data, the interpretation of the magnitude 
would be uniform and the range for -3 to 3 is big enough. We use the median model 
decision rule[16] to select all covariates where the mean of the posterior distribution of 
j
 is greater than 0.5. 
Computation 
 We implemented SSVS using a package BRugs in R-project.[17] We set the burn 
in value to be 2000. Because of the high autocorrelation in the Gibbs sampler, we picked 
1 sample in 20 iterations. We have total 50000 iterations with 2500 sample points. We 




= 0. We set the prior distribution for the 
j
 to be 
Bernoulli distribution with prob( 1
j
) = 0.5.  
 We also had two different models. The first model (Model 1) includes only the 
lag covariates and the second model (Model 2) also included the concurrent covariates. 
The first model is predictive and the second model is for concurrent explanation.   
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Result 
 Selected covariates and the summary statistics of the posterior distributions of 
both models are listed in Table 4 and Table 5 and the entire results is contained in 
Appendix Table A and B.  The MC error is less than 5% of the sample standard deviation 
for all parameters, which indicates that our samples are close enough to the real posterior 
distribution in MCMC sampling.  
Table 4: Selected Covariates for Model 1 
  Posterior Posterior     
Covariates mean S. D MC_error Samples 
HUR2 0.97  0.16 0.0047 2500 
HUR5 0.94  0.24 0.0083 2500 
HUR1 0.90  0.3 0.0101 2500 
HUR4 0.90  0.3 0.0102 2500 
HUR3 0.88  0.33 0.0104 2500 
GOLD5 0.82  0.38 0.0139 2500 
COP5 0.76  0.43 0.0156 2500 
GOLD1 0.66  0.47 0.0144 2500 
COP3 0.54  0.5 0.0177 2500 
 
 The two models yielded similar results except that Model 2 included the 
concurrent HUR. Also, in both models, the dummy variables (HUR and its lags) have 
higher probability to be chosen in SSVS procedure than other quantitative variables. In 
both models, they have more than 88 percent of the time to be chosen.   
 The history plots for the s'  showed that our chains converged reasonably and 
gave a rough idea of the means of the posterior distributions. For example, the history 
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plot for UMP1 appeared to be centered on 0 with relatively little deviation. On the other 
hand the history plot for HUR1 was denser and centered around -2. Both plots are in 
Table 6 and the full history plots for both models are in Appendix Table C and F. 
Table 5: Selected Covariates for Model 2 
 Posterior Posterior   
Covariates mean sd MC_error Samples 
HUR2 0.922 0.27 0.0091 2500 
HUR5 0.9184 0.27 0.007 2500 
HUR4 0.9108 0.28 0.0084 2500 
HUR3 0.9056 0.29 0.0079 2500 
HUR1 0.8908 0.31 0.0109 2500 
HUR 0.888 0.32 0.0097 2500 
GOLD5 0.8168 0.39 0.015 2500 
COP5 0.754 0.43 0.0162 2500 
GOLD1 0.614 0.49 0.0163 2500 
COP3 0.542 0.5 0.0189 2500 
 





  17 
 The density plots for the s'  demonstrated the various shapes of mixture normal 
distributions. The density plot for SUMF1 in model 1 showed that the distribution is 
highly concentrated toward 0 with long tails while the density plot for HUR1 in model 1 
is bimodal with two peaks, one around 0 and one around -2.5.  The density plot alone 
gives us an idea whether this variable is chosen by SSVS. The full density plots for both 
models are in Appendix Table D and G. 
Table 6: The history plot for UMP1 and HUR1 in model 1  
  
 The last plot we would like to examine is the autocorrelation plot for the s' . 
Generally speaking, no parameters are autoregressive from the plots. The correlations 
decreased very fast and close 0 by lag 5 for all parameters in both models. The full 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion and Future Research  
 In this report, we first identified the historical financial crises from the 
perspective of the stock market. We then applied SSVS to search for appropriate 
variables in the logistic regression model. From SSVS, we found that HUR and its lags 
are selected in both models. COP and GOLD are the next variables to be chosen.  
 We found it especially surprising that the dummy variable we created for 
disastrous hurricane (HUR) were selected for every single lag. At this point, we don’t 
know how HUR affects financial crisis. We also suspected that dummy variables might 
have a higher chance to be selected in SSVS applied to logistic regression model with 
standardized exogenous variables.  
 This result matches our assumptions that oil prices and gold prices correlated with 
financial crises, and the unemployment rate and the IRX index are relatively weaker to 
predict financial crises. However, it is not very convincing that these three pieces of 
information – disastrous hurricanes, gold prices and oil prices, along can predict the 
occurrence of financial crises. Nevertheless, it is a good start for this extremely difficult 
problem. We would like to do further research on this topic and find more candidate 
variables. 
 Our future research will focus on the actual performance of the model we 
constructed in this report from SSVS and further explore the dummy exogenous variable 
issue we discovered here. 
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Appendix: Plots from Bayesian Analysis 
Table A: Summary of the posterior distributions from model 1 
 Posterior Posterior    
Covariates mean sd MC_error Samples Selected 
HUR2 0.97  0.16 0.0047 2500 ● 
HUR5 0.94  0.24 0.0083 2500 ● 
HUR1 0.90  0.3 0.0101 2500 ● 
HUR4 0.90  0.3 0.0102 2500 ● 
HUR3 0.88  0.33 0.0104 2500 ● 
GOLD5 0.82  0.38 0.0139 2500 ● 
COP5 0.76  0.43 0.0156 2500 ● 
GOLD1 0.66  0.47 0.0144 2500 ● 
COP3 0.54  0.5 0.0177 2500 ● 
GOLD3 0.49  0.5 0.0133 2500   
Q5S2 0.48  0.5 0.0136 2500   
Q50S2 0.48  0.5 0.0161 2500   
GOLD2 0.47  0.5 0.0143 2500   
GOLD4 0.47  0.5 0.0137 2500   
Q5S1 0.46  0.5 0.013 2500   
Q5S3 0.46  0.5 0.0152 2500   
Q5S1 0.46  0.5 0.0142 2500   
GOLD1 0.46  0.5 0.0138 2500   
GOLD5 0.46  0.5 0.0146 2500   
GOLD2 0.46  0.5 0.0164 2500   
Q5S5 0.45  0.5 0.0154 2500   
Q50S3 0.45  0.5 0.0165 2500   
Q50S5 0.45  0.5 0.0146 2500   
COP4 0.44  0.5 0.0143 2500   
Q5S4 0.43  0.49 0.0175 2500   
Q50S4 0.43  0.5 0.013 2500   
IRX4 0.43  0.5 0.0141 2500   
GOLD3 0.43  0.49 0.0124 2500   
GOLD4 0.43  0.49 0.0135 2500   
 
  20 
Table A continued: 
 Posterior Posterior    
Covariates mean sd MC_error Samples Selected 
IRX3 0.39 0.49 0.0112 2500  
COP2 0.39  0.49 0.0137 2500   
SUMF3 0.36  0.48 0.0115 2500   
SUMF4 0.36  0.48 0.0126 2500   
IRX5 0.35  0.48 0.0111 2500   
COP1 0.35  0.48 0.0126 2500   
SUMF2 0.34  0.47 0.0118 2500   
SUMF5 0.34  0.47 0.0123 2500   
IRX2 0.34  0.48 0.0108 2500   
SUMF1 0.32  0.46 0.0109 2500   
IRX1 0.32  0.47 0.0111 2500   
UMP5 0.26  0.44 0.0102 2500   
UMP1 0.25  0.43 0.0126 2500   
UMP3 0.25  0.43 0.0105 2500   
UMP4 0.21  0.41 0.0104 2500   
UMP2 0.20  0.4 0.0109 2500   
 
Table B: Summary of the posterior distributions from model 2 
  Posterior Posterior       
Covariates mean sd MC_error Samples Selected 
HUR2 0.922 0.27 0.0091 2500 ● 
HUR5 0.9184 0.27 0.007 2500 ● 
HUR4 0.9108 0.28 0.0084 2500 ● 
HUR3 0.9056 0.29 0.0079 2500 ● 
HUR1 0.8908 0.31 0.0109 2500 ● 
HUR 0.888 0.32 0.0097 2500 ● 
GOLD5 0.8168 0.39 0.015 2500 ● 
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COP5 0.754 0.43 0.0162 2500 ● 
    Table B continued: 
  Posterior Posterior       
Covariates mean sd MC_error Samples Selected 
COP3 0.542 0.5 0.0189 2500 ● 
GOLD4 0.4816 0.5 0.016 2500  
CMGDP 0.4808 0.5 0.0162 2500  
Q5S4 0.478 0.5 0.0159 2500  
CMGDP3 0.478 0.5 0.0143 2500  
Q5S1 0.472 0.5 0.0153 2500  
Q50S3 0.4712 0.5 0.0149 2500  
CMGDP5 0.4672 0.5 0.0154 2500  
CMGDP2 0.4668 0.5 0.0141 2500  
Q5S2 0.4656 0.5 0.0148 2500  
Q50S5 0.464 0.5 0.0157 2500  
Q5S3 0.4636 0.5 0.0161 2500  
CMGDP1 0.4624 0.5 0.0152 2500  
Q5S1 0.4616 0.5 0.015 2500  
Q50S4 0.4612 0.5 0.0138 2500  
Q5S5 0.4584 0.5 0.0168 2500  
CMGDP4 0.458 0.5 0.0155 2500  
COP4 0.448 0.5 0.0127 2500  
GOLD2 0.4468 0.5 0.0154 2500  
Q50S2 0.446 0.5 0.0163 2500  
GOLD 0.4336 0.5 0.0129 2500  
IRX3 0.4252 0.49 0.0127 2500  
IRX4 0.4192 0.49 0.0146 2500  
COP2 0.392 0.49 0.0124 2500  
GOLD3 0.3888 0.49 0.0151 2500  
SUMF4 0.3836 0.49 0.0132 2500  
COP1 0.3832 0.49 0.0121 2500  
SUMF2 0.37 0.48 0.0149 2500  
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SUMF3 0.3652 0.48 0.0128 2500  
SUMF1 0.3636 0.48 0.0131 2500  
    Table B continued: 
 Posterior Posterior       
Covariates mean sd MC_error Samples Selected 
SUMF5 0.3504 0.48 0.012 2500  
IRX2 0.3472 0.48 0.0135 2500  
IRX5 0.3404 0.47 0.0115 2500  
IRX1 0.3316 0.47 0.011 2500  
COP 0.3104 0.46 0.0107 2500  
IRX 0.3052 0.46 0.0122 2500  
SUMF 0.3004 0.46 0.0111 2500  
UMP4 0.2924 0.45 0.0141 2500  
UMP 0.2828 0.45 0.0141 2500  
UMP2 0.2728 0.45 0.0117 2500  
UMP3 0.2624 0.44 0.0127 2500  
UMP1 0.2528 0.43 0.0107 2500  
UMP5 0.1576 0.36 0.0109 2500  
 
 
Table C: History plot for the s'  in model 1 
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Table D: Density plot for the s'   in model 1 
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Table E: Autocorrelation plot for the s'  in model 1 
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Table E continued:  
  
 





Table E continued:  
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Table F continued:  
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Table G continued:  
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